Conservative loan loss allowance and bank lending

Abstract

The purpose of this study is to investigate the relation between conservative loan loss accounting practice of banks, defined as accounting behavior that increases loan loss allowances against expected credit losses, and bank lending. Furthermore, we specify the macroeconomic conditions reflecting debtors' borrowing environments and analyze how these conditions affect the relation between conservative loan loss allowances and bank lending. Although existing literature reports that accounting conservatism has a direct effect on non-financial firms' investment behavior, there is little evidence about an effect of conservatism on banks' lending behavior. By exploiting data showing the links between individual Japanese firms and their individual lenders to control both loan demand and supply, we estimate OLS regressions to test the relationships among conservative loan loss allowance, bank lending, and macroeconomic conditions using a unique dataset containing bank-firm-year observations between 2001 and 2013. We find banks that have conservative loan loss allowances tend to provide fewer loans to firms with financing needs when macroeconomic conditions are good and these conservative banks are likely to provide more loans to firms when macroeconomic conditions are bad. Our findings suggest that reflecting expected credit loss into loan loss allowances can mitigate the procyclical behavior of banks.