USING COMPETING THEORIES TO EXPLAIN VARIATIONS IN U.S. POLICE DEPARTMENTS’ REPORTED USE OF FORCE COUNTS

Abstract

Using data from the 2013 Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics (LEMAS) survey, the current study provides a cross-sectional analysis of U.S. police departments’ reported use of force. The goal of this study was to examine the extent to which departments’ reported force counts were explained by rational bureaucratic and/or institutional theory. Given the stark variations in reported force counts, a hurdle model was used to examine the potential effects of the theories on departments’ likelihoods of reporting force and the frequency in which they reported it. The results highlighted the significance of both theories. In terms of rational bureaucratic theory, the results illustrate that the absence of a collective bargaining agreement and greater professionalism requirements reduced departments’ likelihoods of reporting force, while less restrictive administrative policies increased departments’ likelihoods of reporting force and the frequencies in which they reported it. In terms of institutional theory, the results revealed that black officer representation reduced both the likelihood of reporting force and the frequency of force reported. However, increases in jurisdictions’ population and crime rates, for the most part, increased force reports. Combined the theories explained over one-fifth of the variations in departments’ reported use of force for the observed year. The findings suggest that successful efforts to reduce force-related injuries and deaths should consider the contextual environments in which rules and regulations regarding force are made.