The Violence of Representation and the Representation of Violence

Abstract

We could summarise the approach of theory to the problem of violence as the movement through a chiasmus: from ‘the representation of violence to the violence of representation’. The interventions of theory suggest that instead of remaining at the level of the representation of violence, we have to consider that a form of violence is intrinsic to the very act of representation itself. Theory, which refers to those positions that were inspired by paying attention to the sign and the signifier, directs its attention to this ‘primary’ violence at work in the sign. In this way it undermines, or deconstructs, the usual distinction made between violence and representation, which places violence as exterior to, or beyond, representation. Hannah Arendt ascribes such a view to Greek thought when she remarks: ‘Only sheer violence is mute’.1 In contrast, theoretical analysis suggests that, in fact, violence is essential to representation, to language, and to the image. It is ‘empirical’ violence, or representations thereof, that is derivative and secondary, or serves to conceal or distract from this ‘fundamental’ violence. The result is that violence isn’t simply at the limits of representation, but rather it is an internal divide within representation.