Abstract
The Stackelberg equilibrium is a solution concept that describes optimal strategies to commit to: Player 1 (the leader) first commits to a strategy that is publicly announced, then Player 2 (the follower) plays a best response to the leader’s choice. We study Stackelberg equilibria in finite sequential (i.e., extensive-form) games and provide new exact algorithms, approximate algorithms, and hardness results for finding equilibria for several classes of such two-player games.
Cite
CITATION STYLE
Bošanský, B., Brǎnzei, S., Hansen, K. A., Miltersen, P. B., & Sørensen, T. B. (2015). Computation of Stackelberg Equilibria of finite sequential games. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 9470, pp. 201–215). Springer Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-48995-6_15
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