The popular consultation and the United Nations mission in East Timor — first reflections

Abstract

'The popular consultation and the United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) - First reflections' is a personal account by the Head of UNAMET of the process which allowed East Timor to hold a popular consultation to determine its future.The author begins with the Agreement of 5 May 1999 which provided that if the East Timorese rejected the proposed autonomy, there would be a peaceful and orderly transfer of authority to the UN, enabling East Timor to begin a process of transition to independence. This process started with the establishment and deployment of UNAMET which oversaw a total of 446 666 registered people voting. Prior to the ballot UNAMET attempted to get the opposing factions to 'lay down their arms', but the level of violence after the ballot was so great that UNAMET was forced to retreat, handing over responsibility to UNTAET.The death and destruction in East Timor after the ballot provoked various questions which the author responds to, arguing that violence would have been reduced if the popular consultation had taken place with an armed international presence mandated to guarantee security."In reaction to President Habibie's opening up of the independence option, pro-integration militia had been organised throughout East Timor, and had been killing and committing other human rights violations against pro-independence activists and presumed supporters. The pro-independence umbrella organisation, the National Council of East Timorese Resistance (CNRT), and East Timorese solidarity groups argued that security for the ballot could only be guaranteed by an international security presence and/or the withdrawal of the TNI (Indonesian Armed Forces) from the territory. The Agreements, however, left security in the hands of the government of Indonesia, whose police were to be solely responsible for law and order: the TNI as well as the Indonesian police were to maintain absolute neutrality. The international role was limited to a number of UN civilian police officers to act as 'advisers' to the Indonesian police." (127-128)"This was not because the UN was unaware of or unconcerned by militia violence. Indeed the level of concern was such that as the Agreements were signed, the Secretary-General presented a memorandum to the parties, setting out the main elements that would have to be in place for him to be able to determine that the necessary security conditions existed for the start of the operational phases of the popular consultation. These included the bringing of armed civilian groups under strict control and the prompt arrest and prosecution of those who incited or threatened to use violence, a ban on rallies by armed groups while ensuring the freedom of expression of all political forces and tendencies, the 'redeployment' of Indonesian military forces and the immediate institution of a process of laying down of arms by all armed groups to be completed well in advance of the holding of the ballot. But the judgment of the UN negotiators, Portugal and other key member states, was that any attempt to impose on Indonesia an international security presence would mean no agreement and no popular consultation." (128)"But the Agreements required the Secretary-General to ascertain, prior to the start of registration and based on the objective evaluation of UNAMET, that the necessary security situation existed for the peaceful implementation of the consultation process. By mid-June it was clear that this was far from being the case. Although the mission's presence and that of journalists and other international visitors led to a growing normalcy of life in Dili, UNAMET soon witnessed for itself the continuing activity of pro-integration militia, consistent with a flood of reports from around the territory. It became increasingly aware that the TNI was not merely complicit but giving direct leadership to the militia, and that because of this link the police were explicitly excluded from taking action against militia crimes. It confirmed for itself that the estimates of non-governmental organisations that over 40000 persons were internally displaced were not exaggerated, and discovered that their number was continuing to grow as TNI/militia activity persisted in targeting pro-independence localities. The opening of registration was therefore postponed for three weeks, the UN stating truthfully that this was due both to logistical constraints and the security situation." (129)"The Indonesians were told that the UN required the additional three-week period to be used to bring about a reigning-in of the militia. In fact this period saw direct challenges to UNAMET, as its personnel were subjected to militia attacks on its newly-opened office in the town of Maliana and on a humanitarian relief convoy passing through Liquiça. These well-publicised incidents evoked a strong response from the UN and key member states, but the decision on whether to go ahead and open registration on the postponed date of 13 July had to be taken in the context of clear evidence of continuing militia activity and impunity. The UN was concerned not to play into the hands of those who might want to prevent the popular consultation by intimidating its personnel, but the main concern was the continuing widespread intimidation and harassment of pro-independence Timorese. In particular, the fact that internal displacement was still growing, rather than internally displaced persons (IDPs) returning to their homes, raised serious doubts about the feasibility of the comprehensive registration essential for the consultation." (129)"At the opening of registration, it seemed impossible that the IDPs, whose number we estimated by then at around 60000, would be able to register (and then to vote at the same location, as the procedure required), even though the process had been designed to allow persons to register at any registration centre, irrespective of their place of normal residence. In this we underestimated the extraordinary determination and courage of the East Timorese: from the first day they came to register in numbers consistent with estimates for a comprehensive registration, and at mid-point we therefore felt able to continue registration despite the lack of action to address the militia threat. Our concern regarding IDPs continued, but as the end of registration approached it was clear that even they were registering, in part after risking a return to the regions from which they had fled and in part at their current locations. A total of 446666 people registered, 433576 in East Timor and the remainder at external registration centres in Indonesia, Portugal, Australia and elsewhere. This exceeded all expectations, and indeed surpassed the total registered in East Timor for the Indonesian election, even though a substantial number of those registered for the latter were ineligible for the popular consultation (being Indonesians without the connection to East Timor by birth, descent or marriage stipulated in the Agreements)." (130)"Nevertheless, a level playing field was never close to existing, and the campaign period was marked by militia attacks on pro-independence campaigners. Pro-independence students who returned from Indonesia or Dili to establish themselves in the districts provoked the fiercest, sometimes lethal assaults, but several of the newly-opened CNRT offices were also attacked and closed. As the end of the campaign period and the day of the ballot approached, an upsurge in militia activity was evident." (132)"The success of the poll on 30 August nevertheless surpassed all expectations. UNAMET's fears that polling stations might be unable to open in districts of the worst militia violence were not fulfilled,and a small number of temporary closures were quickly resolved by co-operation between the Indonesian and UN police. An astonishing 98.6 per cent of those registered voted: indeed, UNAMET estimated that over half of them were already waiting to vote when polling stations opened. This was all the more remarkable in that thousands had again fled to the hills in response to recent militia violence: they came down to vote, in many cases returning immediately to the hills in anticipation of more violence after the ballot. When the count was completed early on 4 September, 78.5 per cent were found to have voted to reject, and 21.5 per cent to accept the proposed autonomy option." (132-133)"Few doubted before the announcement that the extraordinary turn-out indicated a strong pro-independence majority. The pro-Indonesian hardliners began on polling day itself to prepare to reject the outcome by charging UNAMET malpractice, and went on to boycott the East Timorese Consultative Commission to which they had committed themselves. Violence too was immediate: two UNAMET local staff were killed at the close of polls in Ermera district, and two more were among other killings when militia went on the rampage in Maliana. Elsewhere, including in Dili itself, the announcement of the result was awaited as the signal for the beginning of systematic operations, in which towns and villages were sacked, public and private buildings destroyed, and those East Timorese who did not flee to the interior forced to accept their removal by land or sea to West Timor. A full accounting of the scale of the human rights violations committed must await the reports of the inquiries by the UN-appointed International Commission of Inquiry and by Indonesia's National Human Rights Commission, and the process thereafter of continuing investigation and prosecution. By the end of 1999, hundreds of killings had been documented, as well as accumulating reports of rape. The perpetrators were both Indonesian security forces and East and West Timorese members of militia, but the degree of planning and co-ordination of the operation implied its direction by the TNI, and the removals to West Timor were implemented by the police." (133)"By 8 Se