Hegel on Scepticism and Irony

Abstract

The present essay studies the relationship between skepticism and irony in Hegel’s philosophy. Skepticism represents for Hegel an essential moment in the construction of any true philosophy, for it both represents its introduction as well as its negative side, in which the finite determinations of the intellect contradict themselves, thus revealing their inadequacy. Socratic irony appears to accomplish an analogous function, in that it criticizes false knowledge. Hegel, however, has never thought to raise Socratic irony to a rank equivalent to that taken by Skepticism, because irony is a subjective dialogue strategy, marked by the personal relationship with the discussant; but it is also connected to a bygone age, that of Classical Greece, which cannot be replicated. It follows that Romantic irony cannot perform the function of Skepticism: Schlegel’s attempt to raise irony to a higher spiritual activity is firmly condemned by Hegel, because it becomes an exasperated form of subjectivism, which annihilates what is objective.