From scientific philosophy to absolute positivism: Abel Rey and the vienna circle

Abstract

The concept of scientific philosophy is generally associated with logical positivism or logical empiricism, which is characterized by its recourse to mathematical logic in tackling philosophical problems. But on closer inspection it appears that this concept was employed as early as 1848 by Ernest Renan. The attempt to elaborate a scientific philosophy gave rise to a lengthy debate. At the turn of the twentieth century, Abel Rey took up the issue again. His book, La Théorie de la physique chez les physiciens contemporains, exerted a strong influence on the Vienna Circle. Rey's absolute positivism reveals striking analogies and sharp contrasts with logical positivism. If we find the same requirement for clearness and precision, logic for Rey is not the main focus of philosophical method. The various sciences, from mathematics to psychology, are called on. There is no hierarchy but an encyclopedia, whose aim is to encompass all results of scientific research. By way of a comparative study of Abel Rey and the Vienna Circle, I seek to question the possibility of a scientific philosophy.