Access rights to forests and private conservation: An economic analysis

Abstract

One of the most fundamental questions in forest economics is how to divide forestland between productive and conserved land. In this study, voluntary land conservation by private forest owners is analyzed in two cases: first, in a case in which access to conserved forest is closed; and second, in a case in which there is an open access to the recreational amenities of conserved forest. It is demonstrated that, under private ownership of forestland, recreational open access gives rise to a competitive equilibrium solution in which less forestland is designated to conservation than with the closed-access solution. Essentially this tragedy-of-commons type of result is based on a free-rider behavior. Optimal conservation policies are also studied in the two regimes. When conservation policies are imposed in a closed-access regime, optimal policies become dependent on income distribution and wealth differentials between land-owning and nonlandowning members of society.