This chapter addresses the challenges associated with assessing and improving the resilience of interdependent critical infrastructure systems under potential disruptive events. A specific set of analytical tools are introduced based on quantitative models of infrastructure systems operation and their functional interdependencies. Specifically, the game-theoretic attacker-defender and defender-attacker-defender modeling techniques are applied to assessing the resilience of interdependent CI systems under worst-case disruptions, and advising policymakers on making pre-disruption decisions for improving the resilience of interdependent infrastructures. A case of interdependent power and gas systems is presented to show the proposed model and highlight the significance of protecting interdependent CIs.
CITATION STYLE
Fang, Y., & Zio, E. (2019). Game-theoretic decision making for the resilience of interdependent infrastructures exposed to disruptions. In Advanced Sciences and Technologies for Security Applications (pp. 97–114). Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-00024-0_6
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