Radical Relationism: A Proposal

Abstract

Different relational sociologists have different phenomena in mind when they use the word “relation.” For some, relations are concrete network ties between individuals or groups, while for others relations are something more abstract, such as relative positions in a field. For some authors relations are the elementary unit of analysis for all sociology, while for others relations are one type of emergent social structure among others. In this chapter, I present the rudiments of a radically relational sociological epistemology, based on but extrapolating beyond relational elements in the works of Norbert Elias, Karl Marx, Michel Foucault, Pierre Bourdieu, Harold Garfinkel, Dorothy Smith, David Bloor, and Bruno Latour. By “radically relational” I mean an epistemology that contains no residual dualist elements and therefore treats all social phenomena, including individuals themselves, as constituted through relations.1 This epistemology assumes naturalism and monist materialism but adopts an agnostic stance toward realism. It also applies reflexively to itself. In keeping with this agnosticism, I present the key points of this framework as guidelines for epistemic practice rather than as statements about what it is.