Inferentialism and its discontents

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Abstract

A perennial question in consideration of logic concerns where the rules of logic come from? This question is overflowing with sub-questions regarding, for example, what is meant by the rules of logic; whether or not we are concerned with the justification of rules, or the meaningfulness of certain rules, or both (these are often run together); how do we understand the relationship between logical rules and truth; what is the normative role of logical rules? In this chapter, I provide a brief overview of inferentialism in Sect. 2, before going on to identify a number of concerns frequently made against it.

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APA

Trafford, J. (2017). Inferentialism and its discontents. In Studies in Applied Philosophy, Epistemology and Rational Ethics (Vol. 33, pp. 21–45). Springer International Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-47205-8_2

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