Algeria: Is an Authoritarian Regime More Effective in Combating Terrorist Movements?

Abstract

During the 1990s, the Algerian government was confronted by an armed insurrection conducted by Islamist organizations. It is estimated that roughly 150,000 people died in this civil war between 1991 and 1999. The Algerian army succeeded in defeating the Islamist guerilla but at the cost of numerous violations of human rights. The issue of the “missing”1 exemplifies the difficulties in starting anew after a decade of violence. Above and beyond the debate concerning the number of the missing, this issue underscores the limits of the military leaders’ claims to the legitimacy of their struggle against the Islamists. Though they have attempted to prove that the war the army and its various units waged was a “clean war,” even if there were certain blunders, it is precisely the problem of the missing that raises questions, and fuels the debate on the methods, and the political and human cost of the victory over the former Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) (Front islamique de salut).2 Was the “dirty war” the answer of the Algerian government, a regime that is not democratic, against the Islamists? Would a democracy have waged the war differently? Is a democracy more respectful of its enemies?