Aggressive signaling meets adaptive receiving: Further experiments in synthetic behavioural ecology

Abstract

This paper describes our most recent investigations into aggressive communication. We perform experiments in a simple synthetic ecology, in which simulated animals (animats) are in competition over food. In the first experiment, each animat has an evolved signaling strategy-the degree to which that animat ‘bluffs’ about its aggression level. The form of artificial evolution used features no explicit fitness function. By varying the cost of signaling, we show that the general logic of the handicap principle (according to which high costs enforce reliability) c~al apply in the sort of ecological context not easily studied using formal models. However, because an animal’s behavioura] response to an incoming signal will be determined not only by the signal itself, but also by the degree of importance that that animal gives to the signal, we go on to introduce the concurrent evolution of signaling and receiving strategies. We discuss how, in this more complex scenario, the cost of signaling affects the reliability of the signaling system.