Is experiential-intuitive cognitive style more inclined to err on conjunction fallacy than analytical-rational cognitive style?

Abstract

In terms of prediction by Epstein's integrative theory of personality, cognitive-experiential self-theory (CEST), those people with experiential-intuitive cognitive style are more inclined to induce errors than the other people with analytical-rational cognitive style in the conjunction fallacy (two events that can occur together are seen as more likely than at least one of the two events). We tested this prediction in a revised Linda problem. The results revealed that rational and experiential cognitive styles do not statistically influence the propensity for committing the conjunction fallacy, which is contrary to the CEST's predictions. Based on the assumption that the rational vs. experiential processing is a personality trait with comparatively stabile specialities, these findings preliminarily indicate that those people who are characterized by "rational thinking" are not more inclined to use Bayes' deduction than the other people who are labeled by "intuitive thinking" or by "poor thinking."