A verifiable conformance relationship between smart crd applets and B security models

Abstract

We propose a formal framework based on the B method, that supports the development of secured smart card applications. Accordingly to the Common Criteria methodology, we start from a formal definition and modelling of security policies, as access control policies. At the end of the development process, smart card applications are implemented in a standardized way, based on both the life cycle of smart card applets and the APDU protocol. In this paper, we define a conformance relationship that aims at establishing how smart card applications can be related to security requirement models. This embraces both the notions of security conformance as well as traceability allowing to relate basic events appearing at the level of applications with abstract security policies. This approach has been developed in the RNTL POSÉ project, involving a smart card issuer, Gemalto. © 2008 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg.