The intentional stance and cultural learning: A developmental feedback loop

Abstract

In this paper, I propose a developmental explanation of the reliability of the intentional stance as an interpretive strategy, and by doing so counter an objection to Dennett’s intentional stance theory (i.e. The ‘If it isn’t true, why does it work?’ objection). Specifically, young children’s use of the intentional stance enables them to learn from and thereby to become more similar to the adults in their culture. As a result, they themselves become increasingly intelligible to other people taking the intentional stance. Thus, the intentional stance and cultural learning constitute a feedback loop that (partially) explains the reliability of the intentional stance, and does so - contra Dennett’s realist critics - without appealing to a realist interpretation of the descriptions speakers attach to intentional terms. However, I also suggest that this developmental perspective provides grist to the mill for a causal realist interpretation of the reference of intentional terms, insofar the causal interaction between intentional interpretations of behavior and cognitive development provides an anchor that links intentional terms to functional and/or neural processes. Importantly, causal (as opposed to descriptive) theories of reference make it possible to argue that intentional discourse can be referentially anchored to the causal machinery that produces behavior without generating true descriptions of it. I conclude by drawing out some consequences of the developmental perspective for the way in which we conceptualize the assumption of rationality that is at the core of the intentional stance theory.