While processor based systems often enforce memory protection to prevent the unintended sharing of data between processes, current systems built around reconfigurable hardware typically offer no such protection. Several reconfigurable cores are often integrated onto a single chip where they share external resources such as memory. While this enables small form factor and low cost designs, it opens up the opportunity for modules to intercept or even interfere with the operation of one another. We investigate the design and synthesis of a memory protection mechanism capable of enforcing policies expressed as a formal language. Our approach includes a specialized compiler that translates a policy of legal sharing to reconfigurable logic blocks which can be directly transferred to an FPGA. The efficiency of our access language design flow is evaluated in terms of area and cycle time across a variety of security scenarios. © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2006 Computer Security, Embedded Systems, Reference Monitors, Separation Kernels, Security Policies, Policy Languages.
CITATION STYLE
Huffmire, T., Prasad, S., Sherwood, T., & Kastner, R. (2006). Policy-driven memory protection for reconfigurable hardware. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 4189 LNCS, pp. 461–478). Springer Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/11863908_28
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