This paper considers the prospects for a theory of intergenerational rights in light of certain ontologies of time. It is argued that the attempt to attribute rights to future persons or obligations to present persons towards future persons, faces serious difficulties if the existence of the future is denied (a position I call ‘No-Futurism’). The difficulty of attributing rights to non-existent future persons is diagnosed as a particularly intractable version of the ‘problem of cross-temporal relations’ that plagues No-Futurist views like presentism. I develop a version of the problem of cross-temporal relations regarding cross-temporal normative relations. I then consider and reject various solutions to the problem available to No-Futurists. The upshot of the discussion is that which ontology of time we choose sets constraints on the kinds of explanations we may offer for our future-directed obligations.
CITATION STYLE
Griffith, A. M. (2018). Intergenerational Rights and the Problem of Cross-Temporal Relations. Erkenntnis, 83(4), 693–710. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-017-9909-z
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