Side-channel attacks on SHA-1-based product authentication ICs

Abstract

To prevent product counterfeiting, a common practice is to cryptographically authenticate system components (e.g., inkjet cartridges, batteries, or spare parts) using dedicated ICs. In this paper, we analyse the security of two wide-spread examples for such devices, the DS28E01 and DS2432 SHA-1-based authentication ICs manufactured by Maxim Integrated. We show that the 64-bit secret can be fully extracted using non-invasive side-channel analysis with 1,800 and 1,200 traces, respectively. Doing so, we present the, to our knowledge, first gray-box side-channel attack on real-world devices employing an HMAC-like construction. Our results highlight that there is an evident need for protection against implementation attacks also for the case of low-cost devices like product authentication ICs.