A definition of online authenticated-encryption (OAE), call it OAE1, was given by Fleischmann, Forler, and Lucks (2012). It has become a popular definitional target because, despite allowing encryption to be online, security is supposed to be maintained even if nonces get reused. We argue that this expectation is effectively wrong. OAE1 security has also been claimed to capture best-possible security for any online-AE scheme. We claim that this understanding is wrong, too. So motivated, we redefine OAE-security, providing a radically different formulation, OAE2. The new notion effectively does capture best-possible security for a user’s choice of plaintext segmentation and ciphertext expansion. It is achievable by simple techniques from standard tools. Yet even for OAE2, nonce-reuse can still be devastating. The picture to emerge is that no OAE definition can meaningfully tolerate nonce-reuse, but, at the same time, OAE security ought never have been understood to turn on this question.
CITATION STYLE
Hoang, V. T., Reyhanitabar, R., Rogaway, P., & Vizár, D. (2015). Online authenticated-encryption and its nonce-reuse misuse-resistance. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 9215, pp. 493–517). Springer Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-47989-6_24
Mendeley helps you to discover research relevant for your work.