State versus State: The Principal-Agent Problem in Vietnam’s Decentralizing Economic Reforms

  • Jandl T
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Abstract

… to depend less on domestic factors than on foreign direct investment (FDI) and international trade; thus local cadres may look to foreign investors and markets as they seek rents from …

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Jandl, T. (2014). State versus State: The Principal-Agent Problem in Vietnam’s Decentralizing Economic Reforms. In Politics in Contemporary Vietnam (pp. 64–83). Palgrave Macmillan UK. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137347534_4

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