Gemmell and Naor proposed a new protocol for the authentication of long messages which was based on block codes and which used a transmission channel k times. This multiround authentication makes it possible to limit the key size independently of the message length. We propose a new attack and show that the probability analysis made by Gemmell and Naor, which was only based on the minimum distance property of the codes, does not hold for our attack. Considering also the impersonation attack we conclude that the number of rounds have to be odd.
CITATION STYLE
Gehrmann, C. (1994). Cryptanalysis of the Gemmell and naor multiround authentication protocol. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 839 LNCS, pp. 121–128). Springer Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-48658-5_14
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