Abstract
In this paper, we introduce an experimental approach to the design, analysis and implementation of market mechanisms based on double auction. We define a formal market model that specifies the market policies in a double auction market. Based on this model, we introduce a set of criteria for the evaluation of market mechanisms. We design and implement a set of market policies and test them with different experimental settings. The results of experiments provide us a better understanding of the interrelationship among market policies and also show that an experimental approach can greatly improve the efficiency and effectiveness of market mechanism design. © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2009.
Cite
CITATION STYLE
Furuhata, M., Perrussel, L., Thévenin, J. M., & Zhang, D. (2009). Experimental market mechanism design for double auction. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 5866 LNAI, pp. 1–10). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-10439-8_1
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