Revisiting international law’s discussion on the moral status of the fetus

Abstract

This study examines what hinders international law in establishing a binding guideline for abortion. This work seeks to discuss how debates in international affairs take the subject of the moral status of fetuses. As such, international organizations use the argument of “differences” in ethical standards among countries and world regions as a reason not to have binding abortion rights. This work argues, however, that this reason has invalid premises and is not sufficient to dismiss a binding international abortion law. While the moral status of the fetus is a matter to be further contested, this work argues that a provisional conclusion in the international law is urgent in situations where the unresolved abortion issues render women (pregnant or not) vulnerability, depriving them of a policy protection. Finally, this work concludes that establishing an international abortion law does not necessarily preclude political agents from keeping it under discussion, which keeps law accountable to ethics.