The Motivating Power of Expectations

Abstract

In this paper, I sketch a theory of 'normative expectations' which is intended to explain a continuum of social practices. These range from Nash equilibria (with self-interested preferences) to instances of norm-following behaviour which are contrary to self-interest. The unifying feature is that each person's motivation - self-interested or not - to conform to the practice is conditional on his belief that most other people conform. The theory of normative expectations rests on assumptions about human propensities to feel resentment in certain situations. I claim that these assumptions do not (as some critics have argued) depend on any moral presuppositions, and offer some reasons for thinking that resentment might be evolutionarily adaptive. I also argue (contrary to a recent argument by Binmore) that my theory is not a 'wrong analysis of the wrong game, even though it allows the possibility that people cooperate in Prisoner's Dilemmas.