PENGARUH INFORMASI ASIMETRIK TERHADAP MASALAH AGENCY KONTRAKTUAL DALAM PEMBIAYAAN MUDHARABAH

Abstract

This study analyzed the influence ofAsymmetric Infonnativn ofthe Contractual Agenty Problems in Mudharahah. Asymmetiic information in this study was based on theform ofadverse selection and moral hazard. Moral hazard is an aberration that cannot be observed by Shahibul Maal. Negative actions or activities-ofthe entrepreneur (mudhc^rih) are not known by Shahibul Maal so that mudharib can freely act without the knowledge ofthem. Adverse selection associated with the ethics ofa mudharib inherently and cannot be known certainly by Shahibul Maal The research was conducted on Sharia Commercial Banks\in DIY andCentral Java, namely BTNSyariah, Bank Syariah Mandiri, BRI Syariah. Through regression analysis, it showed that Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection effected on the contractual agency probUms both individually and simultanously