In an auction market where the price of each selling item is restricted to an admissible interval (price rigidities), a Walrasian equilibrium usually fails to exist. Dreze (1975) introduced a variant concept of Walrasian equilibrium based on rationing systems, named constrained Walrasian equilibrium, for modelling an economy with price rigidities. Talman and Yang (2008) further refined the concept and proposed a dynamic auction procedure that converges to a constrained Walrasian equilibrium. However, a constrained Walrasian equilibrium does not guarantee market efficiency. In other words, a constrained Walrasian equilibrium allocation does not necessarily lead to the best market value. In this paper, we introduce a concept of competitive equilibrium by weakening the concept of constrained Walrasian equilibrium and devise an dynamic auction procedure that generates an efficient competitive equilibrium. © 2011 Springer-Verlag.
CITATION STYLE
Zhu, J., & Zhang, D. (2011). Dynamic auction for efficient competitive equilibrium under price rigidities. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 7106 LNAI, pp. 809–818). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-25832-9_82
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