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Book Chapter

De Re and De Se Belief

  • McKay T
Springer Netherlands, (1988), 207-217
DOI: 10.1007/978-94-009-2909-8_12
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Abstract

… The de re belief results from bearing such a relation to something (perceiving Jones from the right in our example), not from the self-attribution of the property of bearing such a relation …

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APA

McKay, T. J. (1988). De Re and De Se Belief. In Philosophical Analysis (pp. 207–217). Springer Netherlands. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2909-8_12

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