The US and Decolonization in Central Africa, 1957–64

Abstract

The interest of the United States in Central Africa in 1945 was minimal or non-existent, but by the time John F. Kennedy entered the White House in 1961 Central Africa, for a brief period, was arguably the most important region for US global Cold War strategy. For the Kennedy administration the African winds of change were not only approaching gale force (albeit temporarily), but were part of the tropical Cold War storms produced by Africa’s significance in the global struggle between communism and capitalism. As awareness of the changing Cold War context developed, Washington’s assessment of the global significance of the African colonies of the European powers underwent a transformation and African decolonization was blown into a central place on the international Cold War stage. However, with the end of the Congo secession crisis and the arrival in the White House of Lyndon Johnson, Central Africa’s importance for Washington was suddenly and dramatically reduced as international organisations and the need to win ‘hearts and minds’ in a decolonizing world assumed very different Cold War significance. Both the changing international situation and the outcome of a ‘responsible’ (that is, moderately centre/centre right) form of independence for most African states, which had largely emerged from the decolonization process by 1965, influenced the changed US approach. Decolonization for Washington had never hinged primarily on the relations between African ‘nationalists’ and the colonial states, but on the enormously important impact these relations had for the international system in general and the Cold War in particular.