The emergence of time's arrows and special science laws from physics

Abstract

In this paper, I will argue that there is an important connection between two questions concerning how certain features of the macro world emerge from the laws and processes of fundamental microphysics and suggest an approach to answering these questions. The approach involves a kind of emergence but quite different from 'top-down' emergence discussed at the conference, for which an earlier version of this paper was written. The two questions are (i) How do 'the arrows of time' emerge from microphysics? (ii) How do macroscopic special science laws and causation emerge from microphysics? Answering these questions is especially urgent for those, who likemyself, think that a certain version of physicalism, which I call 'microphysical completeness' (MC), is true. According to MC, there are fundamental dynamical laws that completely govern (deterministically or probabilistically), the evolution of all microphysical events and there are no additional ontologically independent dynamical or causal special science laws. In other words, there is no ontologically independent 'top-down' causation. Of course,MCdoes not imply that physicists nowor ever will knowor propose the complete laws of physics. Or even if the complete laws were known we would know how special science properties and laws reduce to laws and properties of fundamental physics. Rather, MC is a contingent metaphysical claim about the laws of our world. After a discussion of the two questions, I will argue the key to showing how it is possible for the arrows of time and the special science laws to emerge from microphysics and a certain account of how thermodynamics is related to fundamental dynamical laws. © 2011 The Royal Society.