Verification and Arms Control Treaties

  • Hafemeister D
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Abstract

This chapter describes monitoring and verification technologies, which are discussed within the context of arms control treaties. Nations remain in arms control treaties because they judge the disadvantage of controls on nuclear weapons to be far less dangerous than a system with no controls. The failure of the United States to ratify the Comprehensive–Test–Ban Treaty (CTBT) and its subsequent withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty are exceptions to a global consensus; the world awaits what is in store for arms control.

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Hafemeister, D. (2014). Verification and Arms Control Treaties. In Physics of Societal Issues (pp. 107–148). Springer New York. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-9272-6_4

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