Governments and international standards bodies have established certification procedures for security-critical technologies, such as cryptographic algorithms. Such standards have not yet been established for cryptographic protocols and hence it is difficult for users of these protocols to know whether they are trustworthy. This is a serious problem as many protocols proposed in the past have failed to achieve their stated security properties. In this paper, we propose a framework for certifying cryptographic protocols. Our framework specifies procedures for both protocol designers and evaluators for certifying protocols with respect to three different assurance levels. This framework is being standardized as ISO/IEC 29128 in ISO/IEC JTC1 SC27/WG3, in which three of the authors are project co-editors. As a case study in the application of our proposal, we also present the plan for the open evaluation of entity-authentication protocols within the CRYPTREC project. © 2010 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg.
CITATION STYLE
Matsuo, S., Miyazaki, K., Otsuka, A., & Basin, D. (2010). How to evaluate the security of real-life cryptographic protocols?: The cases of ISO/IEC 29128 and CRYPTREC. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 6054 LNCS, pp. 182–194). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-14992-4_16
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