Democratization and violence: European and international perspectives

Abstract

It is a startling fact that when in the mid-80s a 'third wave' of democracy took hold in Latin America and Eastern Europe, both democracy and violence were simultaneously on the rise worldwide. Almost by definition democracies represent an institutionalized framework and a way of life that ensures non-violent means to share power between communities of people with widely differing values and beliefs. As Keane (2004) points out, 'violence is anathema to [democracy's] spirit and substance' (p. 1). Accordingly, the process of democratization was accompanied by expectations that violence would generally decrease, and that these countries would embark on a process of reducing levels of violence as Western European countries had done earlier in the 19th and 20th century. Why then was the movement of transitions from authoritarian regimes to democratic rule in South America, Central and Eastern Europe, and South Africa accompanied by waves of individual violent crime and collective violence in these countries? Had democracy lost its capacity to contain violence and to generate peaceful habits amongst its citizens? Or did the new liberties and free market policies that came with democratization generate violence amongst citizens, and democracy was actually criminogenic? Were democratic societies at a disadvantage compared to autocracies when it came to the control and containment of violent conflicts? © 2009 Springer-Verlag New York.