Governance by Uncertainty: Changing Patterns in China’s Environmental Enforcement

Abstract

Governance in China is often characterized as dualistic. On the one hand, the state invests in stable, rule-based institutions to support effective policy implementation. Yet the state also engages in sudden regulatory campaigns, overstepping its own laws to implement rapid changes in key sectors. Businesses in China have developed coping mechanisms to weather these uncertainties; they cultivate political ties or learn to accommodate unexpected disruptions. Yet in the sphere of environmental policy implementation, businesses across the spectrum are starting to complain that local environmental enforcement feels unpredictable, even arbitrary. What constitutes unpredictable enforcement in an environment already characterized by high levels of regulatory uncertainty? What changes in environmental enforcement are driving these complaints? Using original data on nine years of city-level enforcement measures, I show that both campaign-style and rule-based enforcement have been increasing in intensity and frequency since the mid-2010s. Through qualitative evidence, I show how these two approaches work at cross purposes, generating mixed signals on which strategies businesses should use to reduce pollution or to mitigate regulatory uncertainty. Data shows that this is a nationwide pattern, which explains why business—even experienced, well-connected businesses—are complaining about arbitrary state action. This study draws attention to emerging stress tests of China’s dualistic governance, while delving into what these changes portend for state-business relations in China.