In a recent paper1 which critically examines and rejects several suggestions that have been made for “bridging the gap” between Husserl’s phenomenology and neuroscience, Rick Grush concludes on a positive note: It should be obvious enough that while I have been highly critical of van Gelder, Varela and Lloyd, there is a clear sense in which the four of us are on the same team. We all believe that an important source of insights for the task of understanding of mentality is what Lloyd describes as “analytic phenomenology,” even if we disagree about how to go about harvesting these insights.
CITATION STYLE
Crowell, S. (2010). Husserl’s Subjectivism: The “thoroughly peculiar ‘forms’” of Consciousness and the Philosophy of Mind* (pp. 363–389). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-0071-0_14
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