Human–algorithm hybrids as (quasi-)organizations? On the accountability of digital collective actors

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Abstract

Models of individual accountability for algorithms’ actions fail when a human–algorithm association comes to be viewed as a collective actor. In some situations, human and algorithmic actions are so closely intertwined that there is no longer a linear connection between the emergent collectivity and the complex interactions of humans and algorithms. In such collective decision-making sequences, individual accountability can no longer be attributed. Therefore, a new perspective on human–algorithm associations that captures their emergent properties and organizational qualities is needed to develop appropriate models of collective accountability. This article seeks to answer a number of questions. How can the encounter between humans and algorithms within such a socio-technical configuration be adequately theorized? Can the configuration itself be understood as a hybrid collectivity? Can actions be attributed to the configuration as a personified collective actor? How will accountability be institutionalized for human–algorithm associations – in centralized or distributed collective forms?.

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Beckers, A., & Teubner, G. (2023). Human–algorithm hybrids as (quasi-)organizations? On the accountability of digital collective actors. Journal of Law and Society, 50(1), 100–119. https://doi.org/10.1111/jols.12412

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