Trading of grade based incentives to avoid free riding and starvation in P2P network

Abstract

P2P networking has emerged as a successful Internet based computing paradigm, which can provide an inexpensive platform for distributed computing. The success of P2P network is directly affected by the selfish behaviours of the peers of the P2P network. To solve this issue, we propose a modified grade based incentive mechanism to reward the cooperating peers and to encourage the free rider to become a good contributor based on the peer contribution to network function. Further if the free rider continues to act against the principles of P2P network, it will lose its credit points and eventually it will be eliminated from the P2P network. It also addresses the issue of starvation and introduces the mechanism of trading of incentives to avoid starvation. We design a simulation to verify this approach and the results shows the improvement of fairness in resource sharing and robustness in P2P network. © 2013 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg.