Detection of Jamming Attacks via Source Separation and Causal Inference

Abstract

— Jamming attacks to hinder communication capabilities are becoming a critical aspect of wireless networks. A challenging issue is the detection of reactive jammers that perform spectrum sensing and attack the network only when legitimate communication is in progress. In this scenario, we introduce a novel framework for reactive jamming detection using a patrol of radio-frequency (RF) sensors external to the network to be protected. The solution relies on two key components: i) a novel underdetermined blind source separation (UBSS) method that, starting from the signal mixtures observed by the RF patrollers, is capable of separating the jamming temporal profile from the network nodes’ transmission profiles; ii) a new jamming detection based on causal inference called all-versus-one transfer entropy (AvOTE). The framework is then applied to a case study where the victim network is a Long Range (LoRa)-based internet of things (IoT) system with star topology. The solution outperforms a state-of-the-art method and an approach that attempts to find the causal relationship via time series correlation, exhibiting very good performance in the presence of shadowing. Indeed, a detection probability of 90% is achieved with a false alarm probability of 6% in the presence of nuisances such as collisions and severe shadowing.