Ethicists in the Laboratory: Reflecting About Non-existent Objects

Abstract

It has often been questioned whether ethics on the laboratory floor is useful, because there is not yet a technology to evaluate in the earlier phases of research. In this article it is argued that ethics does not need the existence of the object it discusses, for its assessments to be meaningful. In discussion with Peter-Paul Verbeek’s ethics of design, and Arie Rip’s prospective ontology, this chapter defends an intensionalist approach to technology which is inspired by Alexius Meinong. This approach allows to distinguish between technologies that are part of reality, and those that are not, without making the realm of the non-existent meaningless. Just like scientific talk about possible capacities of technologies is meaningful, for it leads to assumptions that can be researched, ethics is also able to evaluate those capacities. Both scientists and ethicists are concerned with characteristic capacities of something, before that ‘something’ exists. If we accept that scientists do that, there seems to be no reason why extra arguments should be provided to prove that ethics is a meaningful activity in the laboratory too, and could assess a technology that is still ‘in the making’.