Mixed-ownership reform and strategic choice of Chinese state-owned enterprises

Abstract

The strategic choice of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) is crucial to the sustainable development of China's economy. This paper explores the impact of mixed-ownership reform on the strategic choice of SOEs from the shareholder power and the board power. We find that the greater the diversity of mixed shareholders, the depth of mixed equity, the control of mixed equity, and the excess control of mixed equity, the higher the degree of mixed-ownership reform, and the more likely it is to promote SOEs to choose the prospector strategy. The mechanism test states that the impact of mixed-ownership reform on enterprise strategy is achieved through the balance effect between non-state-owned shareholders and state-owned controlling shareholders with the same power, and the synergy effect between different powers of non-state shareholders. Further research indicates that the mixed-ownership reform has a stronger driving effect on the prospector strategy in SOEs under strict external supervision, competitive industries, and local areas. This study clarifies the governance logic of non-state-owned shareholders on the strategic positioning of SOEs by dual control rights, and it provides empirical evidence for the formulation of enterprises' market-oriented strategic objectives.