Abstract
Liquid democracy is a proxy voting method where proxies are delegable. We propose and study a game-theoretic model of liquid democracy to address the following question: when is it rational for a voter to delegate her vote? We study the existence of pure-strategy Nash equilibria in this model, and how group accuracy is affected by them. We complement these theoretical results by means of agent-based simulations to study the effects of delegations on group's accuracy on variously structured social networks.
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CITATION STYLE
Bloembergen, D., Grossi, D., & Lackner, M. (2019). On rational delegations in liquid democracy. In 33rd AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2019, 31st Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence Conference, IAAI 2019 and the 9th AAAI Symposium on Educational Advances in Artificial Intelligence, EAAI 2019 (pp. 1796–1803). AAAI Press. https://doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v33i01.33011796
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