We investigate how variation in initial conditions, which assign individuals into advantaged or disadvantaged positions, alters behavior. We illustrate the problem within a labor market context and consider the impact of accumulated debt on wage selectivity. Using a two-period model, we show that debt exerts a non-monotonic effect on wage selectivity, with agents assigned low and high levels of debt being significantly more likely to reject an initial wage offer than agents with moderate debt. This prediction is supported by our experiment, which finds a statistically significant dip in wage selectivity for subjects assigned moderate levels of debt.
CITATION STYLE
Gibson, J., & Johnson, D. (2021). Breaking Bad: When Being Disadvantaged Incentivizes (Seemingly) Risky Behavior. Eastern Economic Journal, 47(1), 107–134. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41302-020-00172-6
Mendeley helps you to discover research relevant for your work.