Can economics provide insights into trust infrastructure?

Abstract

Many security technologies require infrastructure for authentication, verification, and other processes. In many cases, viable and innovative security technologies are never adopted on a large scale because the necessary infrastructure is slow to emerge. Analyses of such technologies typically focus on their technical flaws, and research emphasizes innovative approaches to stronger implementation of the core features. However, an observation can be made that in many cases the success of adoption pattern depends on non-technical issues rather than technology-lack of economic incentives, difficulties in finding initial investment, inadequate government support. While a growing body of research is dedicated to economics of security and privacy in general, few theoretical studies in this area have been completed, and even fewer that look at the economics of trust infrastructure beyond simple cost of ownership models. This exploratory paper takes a look at some approaches in theoretical economics to determine if they can provide useful insights into security infrastructure technologies and architectures that have the best chance to be adopted. We attempt to discover if models used in theoretical economics can help inform technology developers of the optimal business models that offer a better chance for quick infrastructure deployment. © 2009 Vieweg+Teubner Verlag | GWV Fachverlage GmbH, Wiesbaden.