What Prompted Shadow Banking in China? Wealth Management Products and Regulatory Arbitrage

Abstract

Shadow banking in China has been growing rapidly; banks use wealth management products aggressively to evade regulatory constraints. The loan-to-deposit ratio or LDR targets both sides of the balance sheet; loans in terms of asset-side, and deposits in terms of liabilitiesside; banks needed to control and maintain both sides. Regulators restricted Chinese banks to maintain a 75% limit for their loan-depositratio. Banks’ needed to either lower their loans or increase the deposits; WMPs helped banks to evade this limit. Banks issue more WMPs to control and manage a 75% statutory ceiling LDR. This WMPs-LDR positive association disappeared post-2015 period. This study empirically examined how Chinese banks use WMPs issuance to avoid regulatory constraints. Quarterly panel data for 30 top Chinese banks were used by analyzing pre-2015 (during the 75% LDR limit) and post-2015 (after removal of the LDR limit). This study also performed fixed-effects model as recommended by the Hausman specification test, with feasible generalized least squares FGLS estimation technique. The results of this study show that for the pre-2015 period, Chinese banks use issuance of WMPs aggressively to manage their LDR limit; this WMPs-LDR relationship disappeared post-2015 period. Moreover, SMBs use WMPs more eagerly as compare to Big4 banks.