Contrastivism about 'ought' holds that 'ought' claims are relativized, at least implicitly, to sets of mutually exclusive but not necessarily jointly exhaustive alternatives. This kind of theory can solve puzzles that face other linguistic theories of 'ought', via the rejection or severe restriction of principles that let us make inferences between 'ought' claims. By rejecting or restricting these principles, however, the contrastivist takes on a burden of recapturing acceptable inferences that these principles let us make. This paper investigates the extent to which a contrastivist can do this. © 2014 Springer International Publishing.
CITATION STYLE
Snedegar, J. (2014). Deontic reasoning across contexts. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 8554 LNAI, pp. 208–223). Springer Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-08615-6_16
Mendeley helps you to discover research relevant for your work.