Game-theoretic cybersecurity analysis for false data injection attack on networked microgrids

Abstract

In well-managed coordinated networked microgrids (MGs) besides electricity interchange between MGs, global optimisation is fulfilled. Here the authors studied a networked MG architecture, in which the control centre of microgrids communicates with a distribution network operator (DNO) to fulfil their local requirements. However, communication signals are always vulnerable to cyberattacks. While the surplus/deficit powers are reported by one MG to DNO, other MGs can act as potential cyber attackers aimed at decreasing their own costs. This action may also lead to threat the global optimisation of networked MGs. When an attacker manipulates the signal sent from the attacked MG to DNO, it will result in a false power interchange schedule produced by DNO. The attacker MG in the next step, maliciously accesses and changes the signal sent from the DNO to the attacked MG. In case a successful attack executed, the operation cost of the attacker MG will be decreased. Furthermore, a game-theoretic model of attacker-defender interaction is proposed, while different behaviours of players are addressed. The optimal scheduling scheme of MGs is formulated as a mixed-integer linear programming problem and solved by CPLEX. Simulation results show the impacts of the attacks and importance of the defend strategies.