Stubborn belief, like self-deception, is a species of motivated irrationality. The nature of stubborn belief, however, has not been investigated by philosophers, and it is something that poses a challenge to some prominent accounts of self-deception. In this paper, I argue that the case of stubborn belief constitutes a counterexample to Alfred Mele's proposed set of sufficient conditions for self-deception, and I attempt to distinguish between the two. The recognition of this phenomenon should force an amendment in this account, and should also make a Mele-style deflationist think more carefully about the kinds of motivational factors operating in self-deception. © 2012 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht.
CITATION STYLE
Lynch, K. (2013). Self-Deception and Stubborn Belief. Erkenntnis, 78(6), 1337–1345. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-012-9425-0
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