An incentive-compatible revenue-sharing mechanism for the economic sustainability of multi-domain search based on advertising

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Abstract

Multi-domain search engines decompose complex queries addressing several issues at a time into sub-queries, and forwards them to one or more domain-specific content providers, typically implemented as Web services. This enables complex searches (e.g., vacation planning, composed of a hotel, flight, and car search), and allows users to receive aggregated and high quality results from a variety of sources. We focus on the design of a revenue sharing mechanism for multi-domain search, considering the general setting in which different actors (content providers, advertising providers, hybrid content+advertising providers, and content integrators) are involved in the search results generation. The design of such a mechanism is paramount for the economic sustainability of multi-domain search. Our revenue sharing mechanism extends the existing sponsored search auctions by supporting heterogeneous participants and allowing the redistribution of monetary values to the different actors. © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012.

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APA

Brambilla, M., Ceppi, S., Gatti, N., & Gerding, E. H. (2012). An incentive-compatible revenue-sharing mechanism for the economic sustainability of multi-domain search based on advertising. Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Including Subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), 7538, 240–254. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-34213-4_16

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