Unconditionally-secure digital signatures

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Abstract

All known digital signature schemes can be forged by anyone having enough computing power. For a finite set of participants, we can overcome this Wealaress. We present a polynomial time protocol in which a participant can convince (with an exponentially small error probability) any other participant that his signature is valid. Moreover, such a convinced participant can convince any other participant of the signature’s validity, without inreraction with the original signer. An extension allows. in most cases, a participant who receives a signature from any source to convince each other participant of its validity. If a participant cannot use the signahue to convince others, he knows so when he receives it.

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APA

Chaum, D., & Roijakkers, S. (1991). Unconditionally-secure digital signatures. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 537 LNCS, pp. 206–214). Springer Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-38424-3_15

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