Social Comparison

Abstract

Social comparisons may be thought to serve two basic functions: (1) to provide a check on one's version of reality, and (2) to serve as a basis for self-evaluation. The former function is demonstrated in the classic Schacter (1959) experiments on affiliation and in the social comparison mechanisms mediating bystander intervention (Latane & Darley, 1970). The latter is exemplified by the typical finding that regardless of the absolute level of one's performance, one is happier being near the top rather than the bottom of the relevant referent group (Brickman & Campbell, 1971; Marsh & Parker, 1984; Smith, Diener, & Wedell, 1989). Common to both functions is the idea that social comparisons can provide norms or standards with which to evaluate the situation or oneself. In this chapter we will focus on the cognitive processes underlying the formation of these judgmental standards. We examine basic judgment research from both social and nonsocial domains, with an aim to explicate some of the principles underlying the comparison process and consider the import of these principles for social comparisons.